How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counter-defense. A game-theoretical view
Shalu Dwivedi, Ravindra Garde, Stefan Schuster

TL;DR
This paper uses game theory to model host-pathogen interactions, revealing conditions for stable or oscillating defense strategies and showing that moderate toxin and enzyme production are optimal.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretical framework for host-pathogen interactions, analyzing equilibrium strategies and resolving paradoxes in toxin and enzyme production.
Findings
Moderate toxin and enzyme production are optimal strategies.
Conditions for steady states versus oscillations are identified.
A generalized matching pennies game describes certain interaction scenarios.
Abstract
Host-pathogen interactions consist of an attack by the pathogen, frequently a defense by the host and possibly a counter-defense by the pathogen. Here, we present a game-theoretical approach to describing such interactions. We consider a game where the host and pathogen are players and they can choose between the strategies of defense (or counter-defense) and no response. Specifically, they may or may not produce a toxin and an enzyme degrading the toxin, respectively. We consider that the host and pathogen must also incur a cost for toxin or enzyme production. We highlight both the sequential and non-sequential versions of the game and determine the Nash equilibria. Further, we resolve a paradox occurring in that interplay. If the inactivating enzyme is very efficient, producing the toxin becomes useless, leading to the enzyme being no longer required. Then, production of the defense…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
