Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Aided Visualizations
Takanori Fujiwara, Kostiantyn Kucher, Junpeng Wang, Rafael M. Martins,, Andreas Kerren, Anders Ynnerman

TL;DR
This paper explores the vulnerabilities of ML-assisted visualizations to adversarial attacks, demonstrating how malicious manipulations can deceive analysts and emphasizing the need for security defenses in ML4VIS.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive analysis of attack surfaces and exemplifies five different adversarial attacks on ML-aided visualizations, highlighting security concerns.
Findings
Adversaries can create deceptive visualizations by exploiting ML input attributes.
Five distinct adversarial attack methods are demonstrated.
Security vulnerabilities in ML4VIS are significant and underexplored.
Abstract
Research in ML4VIS investigates how to use machine learning (ML) techniques to generate visualizations, and the field is rapidly growing with high societal impact. However, as with any computational pipeline that employs ML processes, ML4VIS approaches are susceptible to a range of ML-specific adversarial attacks. These attacks can manipulate visualization generations, causing analysts to be tricked and their judgments to be impaired. Due to a lack of synthesis from both visualization and ML perspectives, this security aspect is largely overlooked by the current ML4VIS literature. To bridge this gap, we investigate the potential vulnerabilities of ML-aided visualizations from adversarial attacks using a holistic lens of both visualization and ML perspectives. We first identify the attack surface (i.e., attack entry points) that is unique in ML-aided visualizations. We then exemplify…
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