Fair Reciprocal Recommendation in Matching Markets
Yoji Tomita, Tomohiki Yokoyama

TL;DR
This paper explores reciprocal recommendation in two-sided matching markets, aiming to balance maximizing matches with fairness of opportunity using envy-freeness and Nash social welfare, validated on synthetic and real data.
Contribution
It introduces a novel method to approximate envy-free recommendations in reciprocal matching markets, balancing match maximization and fairness.
Findings
Heuristic algorithms often cause unfairness despite high match rates.
The proposed approach improves fairness while maintaining high expected matches.
Experimental results confirm effectiveness on synthetic and real datasets.
Abstract
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner while ensuring an appropriate level of fairness in the matching opportunities. We investigate reciprocal recommendation in two-sided matching markets between agents divided into two sides. In our model, a match is considered successful only when both individuals express interest in each other. Additionally, we assume that agents prefer to appear prominently in the recommendation lists presented to those on the other side. We define each agent's opportunity to be recommended and introduce its fairness criterion, envy-freeness, from the perspective of fair division theory. The recommendations that approximately maximize the expected number of matches,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
