On the practicalities of producing a nuclear weapon using high-assay low-enriched uranium

TL;DR

This paper critically examines claims that high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) can be used to produce nuclear weapons, arguing that such claims are unconvincing and highlighting the practical challenges involved.

Contribution

The paper provides a detailed critique of recent claims about HALEU's potential for weaponization, emphasizing the practical limitations and security implications.

Findings

HALEU's use in weaponization is more complex than previously suggested

Practical challenges limit HALEU's effectiveness for nuclear weapons

Lowering civilian enrichment limits may not significantly impact proliferation risk

Abstract

It was recently argued by Kemp et al. that HALEU (high-assay low-enriched uranium, or uranium enriched up to 19.75\%) can conceivably be used to produce a nuclear weapon and on this basis civilian enrichment limits should be lowered to 10% or 12%. We find their argument unconvincing in several respects.