Multi-Item Screening with a Maximin-Ratio Objective
Shixin Wang

TL;DR
This paper develops robust, interpretable, and implementable multi-item screening mechanisms that optimize a maximin ratio, leveraging support information to improve performance guarantees without requiring full distributional knowledge.
Contribution
It introduces a separable mechanism framework based on support information, extending to bundle scenarios and establishing the optimality of randomized bundling under certain ambiguity sets.
Findings
Separable mechanisms depend only on individual item valuations.
Enhanced mechanisms leverage joint support information for better performance.
Randomized grand bundling is optimal within a broad class of ambiguity sets.
Abstract
In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to develop tractable, interpretable, and implementable mechanisms with strong performance guarantees in the absence of precise distributional knowledge. In particular, we study robust screening with a maximin ratio objective. We show that given the marginal support of valuations, the optimal mechanism is separable: each item's allocation probability and payment depend only on its own valuation and not on other items' valuations. However, we design the allocation and payment rules by leveraging the available joint support information. This enhanced separable mechanism can be efficiently implemented through randomized pricing for individual products, which is easy to interpret and implement. Moreover, our framework…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGenetic and phenotypic traits in livestock
