Repeated and incontrovertible collective action failure leads to protester disengagement and radicalisation
Emma F. Thomas, Mengbin Ye, Simon D. Angus, Tony J. Mathew, Winnifred, Louis, Liam Walsh, Silas Ellery, Morgana Lizzio-Wilson, and Craig McGarty

TL;DR
This paper presents an agent-based model showing that repeated, undeniable failures by authorities can lead to widespread protester disengagement and radicalization, potentially triggering revolutionary change.
Contribution
It introduces a novel, empirically supported agent-based framework to understand how repeated authority failures influence protest dynamics and radicalization.
Findings
Responsive authorities foster moderate movements
Repeated failures lead to disengagement and latent radicalism
Disengagement with radical potential may precede revolutionary change
Abstract
Protest is ubiquitous in the 21st Century and the people who participate in such movements do so because they seek to bring about social change. However, social change takes time and involves repeated interactions between individual protesters, social movements and the authorities to whom they appeal for change. These complexities of time and scale have frustrated efforts to isolate the conditions that foster an enduring movement, on the one hand, and the adoption of more radical (unconventional, unacceptable) tactics on the other. Here, we present a novel, theoretically informed and empirically evidenced, agent-based model of collective action that provides a unified framework to address these dual challenges. We model ~10,000 iterations within a simulated society and show that where an authority is responsive, and protesters can (cognitively and/or socially) contest the failure of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
