On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries
Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourv\`es, Panagiotis Patsilinakos

TL;DR
This paper studies the limits of committee election algorithms based on ordinal preferences and few distance queries, revealing bounds on distortion for different committee sizes and query complexities.
Contribution
It introduces bounds on the distortion achievable with limited distance queries in committee elections with Euclidean preferences.
Findings
Bounded distortion for k=2 without distance queries.
Distortion of 3 for m=3 when k=2.
Deterministic algorithms with O(n) distortion using O(k) distance queries.
Abstract
We consider committee election of (out of ) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance to the candidate locations, and each voter's cardinal preferences over committees is defined as her distance to the nearest candidate elected in the committee. We consider a setting where the true distances and the locations are unknown. We can nevertheless have access to degraded information which consists of an order of candidates for each voter. We investigate the best possible distortion (a worst-case performance criterion) wrt. the social cost achieved by deterministic committee election rules based on ordinal preferences submitted by voters and few additional distance queries. For , we achieve bounded distortion without any distance…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
