SoK: Runtime Integrity

TL;DR

This paper systematically reviews Control Flow Integrity and Control Flow Attestation mechanisms, analyzing their goals, assumptions, and design spaces to understand their roles and limitations in runtime defense strategies.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive analysis of CFI and CFA, clarifying their differences, relationships, and positioning within runtime security defenses.

Findings

Highlights the distinct goals and assumptions of CFI and CFA

Identifies gaps and limitations in current runtime defenses

Suggests directions for future research to improve runtime security

Abstract

This paper provides a systematic exploration of Control Flow Integrity (CFI) and Control Flow Attestation (CFA) mechanisms, examining their differences and relationships. It addresses crucial questions about the goals, assumptions, features, and design spaces of CFI and CFA, including their potential coexistence on the same platform. Through a comprehensive review of existing defenses, this paper positions CFI and CFA within the broader landscape of runtime defenses, critically evaluating their strengths, limitations, and trade-offs. The findings emphasize the importance of further research to bridge the gaps in CFI and CFA and thus advance the field of runtime defenses.