No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that in multi-object allocation problems, mechanisms without screening, like serial dictatorship, become more efficient as the variety of objects increases, supported by theoretical and numerical analysis.

Contribution

It characterizes asymptotically efficient mechanisms and introduces the RIB system for vaccination scheduling, showing no-screening mechanisms' superior performance with many objects.

Findings

No-screening mechanisms outperform screening ones as object variety grows.

Automated mechanism design confirms the robustness of the trend.

The RIB system effectively schedules vaccinations in practice.

Abstract

We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. The aim is to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs of screening. We discover a robust trend indicating that no-screening mechanisms, such as serial dictatorship with exogenous priority order, tend to perform better as the variety of goods increases. We analyze the underlying reasons by characterizing asymptotically efficient mechanisms in a stylized environment. We also apply an automated mechanism design approach to numerically derive efficient mechanisms and validate the trend in general environments. Building on these implications, we propose the register-invite-book system (RIB) as an efficient system for scheduling vaccinations against pandemic diseases.