Synthesis of Reward Machines for Multi-Agent Equilibrium Design (Full Version)
Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli

TL;DR
This paper introduces a method for designing dynamic incentive structures, called reward machines, to optimize outcomes in multi-agent games within constrained authority, providing polynomial-time solutions and synthesis techniques.
Contribution
It proposes a novel framework for equilibrium design using reward machines, with polynomial-time algorithms and complexity results for payoff improvement problems.
Findings
Reward machines effectively represent dynamic incentives.
Payoff improvement problem solvable in polynomial time with NP oracle.
Framework extends mechanism design to equilibrium design with constrained authority.
Abstract
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's authority in equilibrium design is more constrained; she can only modify the incentive structures in a given game to achieve certain outcomes without the ability to create the game from scratch. We study the problem of equilibrium design using dynamic incentive structures, known as reward machines. We use weighted concurrent game structures for the game model, with goals (for the players and the designer) defined as mean-payoff objectives. We show how reward machines can be used to represent dynamic incentives that allocate rewards in a manner that optimises the designer's goal. We also introduce the main decision problem within our framework, the payoff…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSupply Chain and Inventory Management
