Noisy information channel mediated prevention of the tragedy of the commons
Samrat Sohel Mondal, Sagar Chakraborty

TL;DR
This paper explores how noise in sensory information channels can unexpectedly promote cooperation in populations engaged in resource-sharing games, revealing a counterintuitive role of information noise.
Contribution
It introduces the concept that noisy information channels can facilitate cooperation in stochastic evolutionary games, a novel perspective on the role of sensory noise in strategic interactions.
Findings
Noisy channels can enhance cooperation in reactive-strategied populations.
Propensity for cooperation decreases with mutual information of the channel.
Counterintuitive role of information noise in sustaining cooperation.
Abstract
Synergy between evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and fluctuating state of shared resource being consumed by the cooperators is essential for averting the tragedy of the commons. Not only in humans, but also in the cognitively-limited organisms, this interplay between the resource and the cooperation is ubiquitously witnessed. The strategically interacting players engaged in such game-environment feedback scenarios naturally pick strategies based on their perception of the environmental state. Such perception invariably happens through some sensory information channels that the players are endowed with. The unfortunate reality is that any sensory channel must be noisy due to various factors; consequently, the perception of the environmental state becomes faulty rendering the players incapable of adopting the strategy that they otherwise would. Intriguingly, situation is not as bad as…
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Taxonomy
TopicsIdeological and Political Education
