Decentralized Fair Division
Joel Miller, Rishi Advani, Ian Kash, Chris Kanich, Lenore Zuck

TL;DR
This paper introduces a decentralized approach to fair division inspired by altruistic behaviors, comparing it with centralized methods and analyzing their fairness and efficiency under various conditions.
Contribution
It proposes a novel decentralized model for fair division, analyzing its performance and conditions for outperforming centralized approaches.
Findings
Decentralized model can achieve high-quality allocations efficiently.
Contrasting fairness and social welfare guarantees between models.
Conditions identified where mixed approaches outperform individual ones.
Abstract
Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed in behavioral economics and other practical settings. We develop an approach for decentralized fair division and compare it with a centralized approach with respect to fairness and social welfare guarantees. Our decentralized model can be seen as a relaxation of previous models of sequential exchange, in light of impossibility results concerning the inability of those models to achieve desirable outcomes. We find that the two models of resource allocation offer contrasting fairness and social welfare guarantees, and map out how these guarantees depend on valuations and other model parameters. We further show conditions under which a mix of the two…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLaw and Political Science
