A Lower Bound for Local Search Proportional Approval Voting
Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind

TL;DR
This paper establishes a super-polynomial lower bound for a local search algorithm used in proportional approval voting, and empirically compares two variants of the algorithm on real and synthetic data.
Contribution
It proves a super-polynomial lower bound for the local search algorithm's convergence time when improvements are arbitrarily small, and empirically compares better-response and best-response variants.
Findings
Lower bound of k^{\u2212}k} for local search convergence time.
Better-response variant converges faster than best-response in experiments.
Abstract
Selecting out of items based on the preferences of heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over bundles -- an agent receives utility if of her approved items are selected -- then welfare optimisation is captured by a voting rule known as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV also satisfies demanding fairness axioms. However, finding a winning set of items under PAV is NP-hard. In search of a tractable method with strong fairness guarantees, a bounded local search version of PAV was proposed by Aziz et al. It proceeds by starting with an arbitrary size- set and, at each step, checking if there is a pair of candidates , such that swapping and increases the total welfare by at least…
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