Bayesian rational agents in iterated quantum games
John B. DeBrota, Peter J. Love

TL;DR
This paper models Bayesian rational agents playing iterated quantum games, demonstrating how beliefs about entanglement influence learning, strategic choices, and quantum advantage in the CHSH game and prisoners' dilemma.
Contribution
It introduces a Bayesian agent framework for quantum games, showing how players learn and adapt beliefs about entanglement affecting their strategies and outcomes.
Findings
Players can learn entanglement presence and achieve quantum advantage.
Belief in entanglement influences strategic decisions and outcomes.
Strong belief in entanglement can lead to optimal play even without actual entanglement.
Abstract
We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about the actions or beliefs of the other player. Each takes actions which maximize their expected utility and revises their beliefs with the classical Bayes rule between rounds. We simulate iterated play to see if and how players can learn about the presence of shared entanglement and to explore how their performance, their beliefs, and the game's structure interrelate. In the CHSH game, we find that players can learn that entanglement is present and use this to achieve quantum advantage. We find that they can only do so if they also believe the other player will act correctly to exploit the entanglement. In the case of low or zero entanglement in the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
