Evolutionary dynamics in stochastic nonlinear public goods games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a probabilistic framework to analyze how stochastic nonlinear effects influence cooperation in public goods games, revealing conditions that promote prosocial behavior in complex social systems.

Contribution

It develops a new stochastic nonlinear model for public goods games, combining analytical and simulation methods to explore cooperation dynamics under uncertainty.

Findings

Higher nonlinearity favors synergy over discounting, promoting cooperation.

Network reciprocity is less effective when synergy probability is low.

Group size has nonlinear effects on cooperation, independent of population structure.

Abstract

Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous models mainly focus on deterministic nonlinearity where the arise of synergy or discounting effect is determined by certain conditions, ignoring uncertainty and stochasticity in real-world systems. Here, we develop a probabilistic framework to study the cooperative behavior in stochastic nonlinear public goods games. Through both analytical treatment and Monte Carlo simulations, we provide comprehensive understanding of social dilemmas with stochastic nonlinearity in both well-mixed and structured populations. We find that increasing the degree of nonlinearity makes synergy more advantageous when competing with discounting, thereby promoting cooperation. Interestingly, we show that network reciprocity loses effectiveness when the probability of synergy is small. Moreover, group size exhibits nonlinear effects on group cooperation regardless of the underlying structure. Our findings thus provide novel insights into how stochastic nonlinearity influences the emergence of prosocial behavior.