Designing High-Occupancy Toll Lanes: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Zhanhao Zhang, Ruifan Yang, Manxi Wu

TL;DR
This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze and optimize the design of HOT lanes, including toll pricing and capacity allocation, considering traveler heterogeneity and multiple highway configurations.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive game-theoretic framework for HOT lane design, extending to multi-node highways and incorporating data-driven demand estimation.
Findings
Optimal tolls vary with capacity and demand conditions.
Equilibrium strategies depend on travelers' preferences and congestion levels.
Proposed toll designs outperform current pricing in simulations.
Abstract
In this article, we study the optimal design of High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. The traffic authority determines the road capacity allocation between HOT lanes and ordinary lanes, as well as the toll price charged for travelers using HOT lanes who do not meet the high-occupancy eligibility criteria. We develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the decisions of travelers with heterogeneous preference parameters in values of time and carpool disutilities. These travelers choose between paying or forming carpools to use the HOT lanes, or taking the ordinary lanes. Travelers' welfare depends on the congestion cost of the lane they use, the toll payment, and the carpool disutilities. For highways with a single entrance and exit node, we provide a complete characterization of equilibrium strategies and a comparative statics analysis of how the equilibrium vehicle flow and travel time change…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTransportation Planning and Optimization · Vehicle emissions and performance · Traffic control and management
