SeCritMass: Threshold Secret Petitions
Florian Breuer

TL;DR
This paper introduces n-threshold secret petitions enabling encrypted signatures to be decrypted only when a minimum number of signatures is reached, enhancing privacy in sensitive reporting scenarios.
Contribution
It proposes a novel cryptographic protocol for threshold secret petitions and provides an implementation based on ElGamal encryption.
Findings
Successful implementation of threshold secret petitions
Enhanced privacy for sensitive reporting
Potential applications in misconduct reporting
Abstract
We introduce the notion of an -threshold secret petition, in which users add encrypted signatures to a petition, and the signatures are decrypted if and only if at least signatures have been gathered. This solves the coordination problem in which users wish to sign a petition or commit to a cause, but do not want to be identified as having signed it before enough others have signed it too. We present an implementation of such a petition based on the ElGamal cryptosystem. Applications include reporting misconduct in situations were complainants hesitate to come forward alone, such as in allegations of sexual harassment or police brutality.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
