Application of Superconducting Technology in the Electricity Industry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies and Power Company Equipment Upgrade Decisions

TL;DR

This paper uses game theory to analyze how government subsidies influence power companies' decisions to adopt superconducting technology, highlighting the importance of subsidy timing and amounts for market efficiency.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game-theoretic model incorporating sensitivity analysis of subsidy parameters affecting technology adoption in the power industry.

Findings

Time delays and initial subsidies critically affect adoption rates.

Market efficiency depends on strategic interactions modeled.

Broad trends identified due to data limitations.

Abstract

This study investigates the potential impact of "LK-99," a novel material developed by a Korean research team, on the power equipment industry. Using evolutionary game theory, the interactions between governmental subsidies and technology adoption by power companies are modeled. A key innovation of this research is the introduction of sensitivity analyses concerning time delays and initial subsidy amounts, which significantly influence the strategic decisions of both government and corporate entities. The findings indicate that these factors are critical in determining the rate of technology adoption and the efficiency of the market as a whole. Due to existing data limitations, the study offers a broad overview of likely trends and recommends the inclusion of real-world data for more precise modeling once the material demonstrates room-temperature superconducting characteristics. The research contributes foundational insights valuable for future policy design and has significant implications for advancing the understanding of technology adoption and market dynamics.