Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: an experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting
Yoichi Hizen, Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama, Takehito Masuda

TL;DR
This experimental study investigates voter turnout in two-tier elections, revealing that turnout deviates from theoretical predictions with minority groups voting less and majority groups voting more, especially under proportional rules, affecting overall welfare.
Contribution
The paper provides empirical evidence on how two-tier voting rules influence voter turnout and welfare, highlighting effects not predicted by existing theory.
Findings
Turnout is lower in minority groups than predicted.
Majority groups exhibit higher turnout than expected.
Welfare inequality increases under proportional rules.
Abstract
We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that, compared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the minority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority camp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the distribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically predicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
