Accurate and Scalable Detection and Investigation of Cyber Persistence Threats
Qi Liu, Muhammad Shoaib, Mati Ur Rehman, Kaibin Bao, Veit Hagenmeyer, Wajih Ul Hassan

TL;DR
This paper presents CPD, a provenance-based system for detecting cyber persistence threats in APT attacks, significantly reducing false positives through innovative causal analysis and alert triage.
Contribution
The paper introduces pseudo-dependency edges and expert-guided edges to improve detection accuracy and efficiency in identifying persistent threats.
Findings
Reduces false positive rate by 93% compared to existing methods.
Effectively detects persistence setup and execution phases in cyber attacks.
Enhances detection speed and accuracy with novel provenance analysis techniques.
Abstract
In Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks, achieving stealthy persistence within target systems is often crucial for an attacker's success. This persistence allows adversaries to maintain prolonged access, often evading detection mechanisms. Recognizing its pivotal role in the APT lifecycle, this paper introduces Cyber Persistence Detector (CPD), a novel system dedicated to detecting cyber persistence through provenance analytics. CPD is founded on the insight that persistent operations typically manifest in two phases: the "persistence setup" and the subsequent "persistence execution". By causally relating these phases, we enhance our ability to detect persistent threats. First, CPD discerns setups signaling an impending persistent threat and then traces processes linked to remote connections to identify persistence execution activities. A key feature of our system is the…
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