On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three
David Mik\v{s}an\'ik, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup

TL;DR
This paper introduces new tournament rules that are Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategy-proof against collusions of size three, improving upon existing rules by reducing manipulability and exploring rule reductions.
Contribution
It generalizes a known tournament rule to d-ary trees, proposes a novel rule with better non-manipulability properties, and initiates the study of reductions among tournament rules.
Findings
Proposed a generalized Randomized Single Elimination Bracket rule with bounded manipulability.
Introduced a new tournament rule that is Condorcet-consistent and 3-SNM-1/2, outperforming previous rules.
Started the exploration of reductions among different tournament rules.
Abstract
A tournament organizer must select one of possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the following desiderata. It must be Condorcet-consistent (henceforth, CC), meaning it selects as the winner the unique team that beats all other teams (if one exists). It must also be strongly non-manipulable for groups of size at probability (henceforth, k-SNM-), meaning that no subset of teams can fix the matches among themselves in order to increase the chances any of it's members being selected by more than . Our contributions are threefold. First, wee consider a natural generalization of the Randomized Single Elimination Bracket rule from [Schneider et al. 2017] to -ary trees and provide upper bounds to its…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Cryptography and Data Security
