MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist In-DRAM Tracker
Moinuddin Qureshi, Salman Qazi, Aamer Jaleel

TL;DR
This paper introduces MINT, a minimalist in-DRAM tracker that uses only a single entry to securely mitigate Rowhammer attacks, achieving comparable protection with minimal hardware overhead.
Contribution
The paper presents MINT, a novel ultra low-cost in-DRAM tracker that guarantees security with just one entry, improving over existing low-cost solutions in efficiency and security.
Findings
MINT provides guaranteed protection against single and double-sided Rowhammer attacks.
MINT achieves a MinTRH of 1482, reducible to 356 with RFM.
MINT's MinTRH is within 2x of an ideal one-counter-per-row design.
Abstract
This paper investigates secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers for mitigating Rowhammer (RH). In-DRAM solutions have the advantage that they can solve the RH problem within the DRAM chip, without relying on other parts of the system. However, in-DRAM mitigation suffers from two key challenges: First, the mitigations are synchronized with refresh, which means we cannot mitigate at arbitrary times. Second, the SRAM area available for aggressor tracking is severely limited, to only a few bytes. Existing low-cost in-DRAM trackers (such as TRR) have been broken by well-crafted access patterns, whereas prior counter-based schemes require impractical overheads of hundreds or thousands of entries per bank. The goal of our paper is to develop an ultra low-cost secure in-DRAM tracker. Our solution is based on a simple observation: if only one row can be mitigated at refresh, then we should ideally…
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