ImPress: Securing DRAM Against Data-Disturbance Errors via Implicit Row-Press Mitigation
Moinuddin Qureshi, Anish Saxena, Aamer Jaleel

TL;DR
ImPress is a novel mitigation technique that protects DRAM from both Rowhammer and Row-Press vulnerabilities without performance overheads or reducing the Rowhammer threshold, by treating long-open rows as activations.
Contribution
ImPress introduces an implicit mitigation approach that is compatible with existing solutions and does not require restricting row-open-time or redesigning Rowhammer defenses.
Findings
ImPress effectively neutralizes Row-Press attacks.
It maintains the Rowhammer threshold while providing security.
Compatible with both in-DRAM and controller-based trackers.
Abstract
DRAM cells are susceptible to Data-Disturbance Errors (DDE), which can be exploited by an attacker to compromise system security. Rowhammer is a well-known DDE vulnerability that occurs when a row is repeatedly activated. Rowhammer can be mitigated by tracking aggressor rows inside DRAM (in-DRAM) or at the Memory Controller (MC). Row-Press (RP) is a new DDE vulnerability that occurs when a row is kept open for a long time. RP significantly reduces the number of activations required to induce an error, thus breaking existing RH solutions. Prior work on Explicit Row-Press mitigation, ExPress, requires the memory controller to limit the maximum row-open-time, and redesign existing Rowhammer solutions with reduced Rowhammer threshold. Unfortunately, ExPress incurs significant performance and storage overheads, and being a memory controller-based solution, it is incompatible with in-DRAM…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
