Similarity of Information and Collective Action

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how information similarity affects collective action, showing that more similar information can either help or hinder coordination depending on the difficulty of achieving the goal.

Contribution

It provides a theoretical framework linking information similarity to collective action outcomes, with applications to political protests and committee decision-making.

Findings

More similar information helps coordinate when goals are hard to achieve.

More similar information can worsen free-riding in easy tasks.

Diversity in information is beneficial when individual votes are impactful.

Abstract

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight.