Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms

TL;DR

This paper introduces two justified fairness properties in house allocation problems without monetary transfers, characterizing serial and sequential dictatorships when combined with strategy-proofness and non-bossiness.

Contribution

It provides two novel fairness properties that uniquely characterize serial and sequential dictatorships in house allocation mechanisms.

Findings

Two properties characterize serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships.

The properties, combined with strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, fully identify these mechanisms.

The work advances understanding of fairness and strategy-proofness in house allocation.

Abstract

We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.