Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance

TL;DR

This paper models how agents with different ideologies form networks with varying cohesion and tolerance, revealing conditions for societal segregation and how subsidies can reduce polarization.

Contribution

It introduces a dynamic model of ideological network formation considering cohesion, tolerance, and investments, highlighting mechanisms behind segregation and polarization.

Findings

Segregation occurs when cohesion is strong and some tolerate distant ideologies.

Subsidies to connections can reduce societal polarization.

Networks become segregated under certain equilibrium conditions.

Abstract

Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.