What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says: Defending Bare Probabilism
David Wallace
TL;DR
This paper defends the bare probabilism interpretation of Gibbsian statistical mechanics, clarifying its stance and responding to recent critiques to establish its validity within the mainstream framework.
Contribution
It provides a detailed defense of the bare probabilism view in Gibbsian statistical mechanics, addressing recent criticisms and clarifying its interpretative stance.
Findings
Reaffirms the validity of bare probabilism in Gibbsian mechanics
Responds to and counters recent critiques by Frigg and Werndl
Clarifies the interpretative stance of Gibbsian statistical mechanics
Abstract
I expound and defend the ``bare probabilism'' reading of Gibbsian (i.e. mainstream) statistical mechanics, responding to Frigg and Werndl's recent (BJPS 72 (2021), 105-129) plea: ``can somebody please say what Gibbsian statistical mechanics says?''
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Taxonomy
TopicsStatistical Mechanics and Entropy · Advanced Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics · Gaussian Processes and Bayesian Inference