Why you do not need to worry about the standard argument that you are a Boltzmann brain
Carlo Rovelli, David Wolpert

TL;DR
This paper argues that the common philosophical and scientific concern about being a Boltzmann brain is flawed because it relies on assuming the reliability of our past data, which contradicts the hypothesis itself.
Contribution
It highlights a logical inconsistency in Boltzmann brain arguments by showing they depend on presupposing the reliability of past data, which the hypothesis questions.
Findings
Boltzmann brain hypothesis relies on data about the past.
Arguments against Boltzmann brains are self-contradictory.
Incomplete evidence can lead to false conclusions.
Abstract
Are you, with your perceptions, memories and observational data, a Boltzmann brain, namely a fleeting statistical fluctuation out of the thermal equilibrium of the universe? Arguments are given in the literature claiming that this bizarre hypothesis needs to be considered seriously, that all of our data about the past is actually a mirage. We point to a difficulty in these arguments. They are based on the dynamical laws and on statistical arguments, but they disregard the fact that we infer the dynamical laws presupposing the reliability of our data records about the past. Hence the reasoning in favor of the Boltzmann brain hypothesis contradicts itself, relying on the reliability of our data about the past to conclude that that data is wrong. More broadly, it is based on incomplete evidence. Incomplete evidence notoriously leads to false conclusions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Mechanics and Applications · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
