Social AI and The Equation of Wittgenstein's Language User With Calvino's Literature Machine

TL;DR

This paper argues that large language models are Wittgensteinian language users but not full psychological agents, comparing them to Calvino's literature machines and highlighting the limits of ascribing emotions to social AI.

Contribution

It introduces a novel framework combining Wittgenstein's language use with Calvino's literature machines to critique the functionalist view of social AI and its psychological attributions.

Findings

LLMs instantiate Wittgensteinian language use

Social AIs lack autopoiesis for narrative and sensemaking

Ascribing psychological predicates to social AI is a misguided functionalist temptation

Abstract

Is it sensical to ascribe psychological predicates to AI systems like chatbots based on large language models (LLMs)? People have intuitively started ascribing emotions or consciousness to social AI ('affective artificial agents'), with consequences that range from love to suicide. The philosophical question of whether such ascriptions are warranted is thus very relevant. This paper advances the argument that LLMs instantiate language users in Ludwig Wittgenstein's sense but that ascribing psychological predicates to these systems remains a functionalist temptation. Social AIs are not full-blown language users, but rather more like Italo Calvino's literature machines. The ideas of LLMs as Wittgensteinian language users and Calvino's literature-producing writing machine are combined. This sheds light on the misguided functionalist temptation inherent in moving from equating the two to the ascription of psychological predicates to social AI. Finally, the framework of mortal computation is used to show that social AIs lack the basic autopoiesis needed for narrative fa\c{c}ons de parler and their role in the sensemaking of human (inter)action. Such psychological predicate ascriptions could make sense: the transition 'from quantity to quality' can take place, but its route lies somewhere between life and death, not between affective artifacts and emotion approximation by literature machines.