AoA-Based Physical Layer Authentication in Analog Arrays under Impersonation Attacks

TL;DR

This paper explores the use of angle of arrival (AoA) for authenticating users in analog array MIMO systems, analyzing attack strategies and the effectiveness of AoA-based classifiers against impersonation attempts.

Contribution

It introduces AoA-based authentication for analog array MIMO systems and evaluates its robustness against various impersonation attacks using one-class classifiers.

Findings

Some attack techniques can successfully falsify AoA estimates

AoA-based authentication can be compromised with side information

One-class classifiers have limitations against sophisticated attacks

Abstract

We discuss the use of angle of arrival (AoA) as an authentication measure in analog array multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. A base station equipped with an analog array authenticates users based on the AoA estimated from certified pilot transmissions, while active attackers manipulate their transmitted signals to mount impersonation attacks. We study several attacks of increasing intensity (captured through the availability of side information at the attackers) and assess the performance of AoA-based authentication using one-class classifiers. Our results show that some attack techniques with knowledge of the combiners at the verifier are effective in falsifying the AoA and compromising the security of the considered type of physical layer authentication.