Fair and Truthful Allocations Under Leveled Valuations
George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis

TL;DR
This paper investigates fair division of indivisible goods among agents with leveled valuation functions, providing new approximation guarantees for MMS and EFX fairness notions, and designing truthful mechanisms.
Contribution
It introduces new approximation bounds for MMS under leveled valuations, proves existence of exact EFX allocations, and develops truthful protocols for fair division.
Findings
Existence of 2/3-MMS allocations for leveled, submodular valuations.
Existence of 2/3-MMS allocations for two submodular agents.
Existence of exact EFX allocations under general leveled valuations.
Abstract
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents which are equipped with {\em leveled} valuation functions. Such preferences, that have been studied before in economics and fair division literature, capture a simple and intuitive economic behavior; larger bundles are always preferred to smaller ones. We provide a fine-grained analysis for various subclasses of leveled valuations focusing on two extensively studied notions of fairness, (approximate) MMS and EFX. In particular, we present a general positive result, showing the existence of -MMS allocations under valuations that are both leveled and submodular. We also show how some of our ideas can be used beyond the class of leveled valuations; for the case of two submodular (not necessarily leveled) agents we show that there always exists a -MMS allocation, complementing a recent impossibility result.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models
