Basins of Attraction in Two-Player Random Ordinal Potential Games
Andrea Collevecchio, Hlafo Alfie Mimun, Matteo Quattropani, and Marco, Scarsini

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the distribution of basin sizes of pure Nash equilibria in two-player ordinal potential games with many actions, providing asymptotic expected basin sizes as the number of actions grows large.
Contribution
It offers the first asymptotic analysis of the expected basin of attraction sizes for pure Nash equilibria in large two-player ordinal potential games.
Findings
Expected basin size converges as number of actions increases
Distribution of basin sizes is characterized asymptotically
Pure Nash equilibria have quantifiable attraction basins in large games
Abstract
We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions . Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these pure Nash equilibria; which one depends on the starting point. So, each pure Nash equilibrium has a basin of attraction. We pick uniformly at random one game from this class and we study the joint distribution of the sizes of the basins of attraction. We provide an asymptotic exact value for the expected basin of attraction of each pure Nash equilibrium, when the number of actions goes to infinity.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGuidance and Control Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Military Defense Systems Analysis
