Closed-loop equilibria for Stackelberg games: a story about stochastic targets
Camilo Hern\'andez, Nicol\'as Hern\'andez Santib\'a\~nez, Emma Hubert, Dylan Possama\"i

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel method to reformulate continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential games with closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimization problem with target constraints, enabling equilibrium characterization.
Contribution
It develops a new framework for analyzing Stackelberg games with closed-loop strategies by using second-order backward stochastic differential equations and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.
Findings
Reformulation as a standard stochastic control problem with target constraints.
Characterization of equilibrium strategies via HJB equations.
Illustration through a simple example for theoretical and numerical comparison.
Abstract
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a Stackelberg game in which the leader and the follower can both control the drift and the volatility of a stochastic output process, in order to maximise their respective expected utility. The aim is to characterise the Stackelberg equilibrium when the players adopt 'closed-loop strategies', i.e. their decisions are based solely on the historical information of the output process, excluding especially any direct dependence on the underlying driving noise, often unobservable in real-world applications. We first show that, by considering the second-order backward stochastic differential equation associated with the continuation utility of the follower as a…
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