Simple Delegated Choice
Ali Khodabakhsh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart

TL;DR
This paper analyzes delegation in discrete choice models, providing approximation bounds for simple threshold policies under various utility distributions and biases, with applications to assortment optimization.
Contribution
It introduces tight approximation analyses for delegation policies in discrete choice settings, including new bounds for correlated utilities and applications to assortment optimization.
Findings
3-approximation for independent utilities
Logarithmic approximation when outside options exist
Hardness results for correlated utilities
Abstract
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action which vary based on the state of the world, and which may not be aligned. The principal may commit to a mechanism, which maps reports of the agent to actions. When this mechanism is deterministic, it can take the form of a menu of actions, from which the agent simply chooses upon observing the state. In this case, the principal is said to have delegated the choice of action to the agent. We consider a setting where the decision being delegated is a choice of a utility-maximizing action from a set of several options. We assume the shared portion of the agent's and principal's utilities is drawn from a distribution known to the principal, and that…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
