Risk-Dominant Equilibrium in Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
Ahmed S. Elgazzar

TL;DR
This paper explores how entanglement influences the selection of risk-dominant equilibrium in quantum prisoner's dilemma, showing that entanglement promotes cooperation and improves outcomes.
Contribution
It demonstrates that entanglement fully determines the risk-dominant equilibrium in the quantum prisoner's dilemma, highlighting its role in quantum game dynamics.
Findings
Entanglement controls the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Entanglement promotes quantum cooperation.
Improves outcome in the quantum prisoner's dilemma.
Abstract
The choice of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) is crucial in theoretical classical and quantum games. The Eiswer-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantization scheme solves the prisoner's dilemma only for high entanglement. At medium entanglement, there are multiple NEs. We investigate the selection of a unique NE in the quantum prisoner's dilemma with variable dilemma strength parameters. The risk-dominance criterion is used. The influence of the dilemma strength parameters and entanglement is emphasized. We found that entanglement completely controls the risk-dominant equilibrium. Entanglement promotes quantum-cooperation in the risk-dominant equilibrium and thus improves its outcome.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Mechanics and Applications · Economic theories and models
