Computing Nonequilibrium Responses with Score-shifted Stochastic Differential Equations
J\'er\'emie Klinger, Grant M. Rotskoff

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel method to compute responses of nonequilibrium stochastic systems to perturbations by using an effective dynamics involving the score function, enabling response calculations without full knowledge of the system's probability density.
Contribution
The authors develop a new approach leveraging score functions and effective dynamics to analyze nonequilibrium responses, extending the applicability beyond traditional path ensemble methods.
Findings
Effective dynamics accurately predicts responses to diffusion changes.
Score-based algorithms enable response calculations without exact density.
Method applicable to complex nonequilibrium systems.
Abstract
Using equilibrium fluctuations to understand the response of a physical system to an externally imposed perturbation is the basis for linear response theory, which is widely used to interpret experiments and shed light on microscopic dynamics. For nonequilibrium systems, perturbations cannot be interpreted simply by monitoring fluctuations in a conjugate observable -- additional dynamical information is needed. The theory of linear response around nonequilibrium steady states relies on path ensemble averaging, which makes this theory inapplicable to perturbations that affect the diffusion constant or temperature in a stochastic system. Here, we show that a separate, ``effective'' physical process can be used to describe the perturbed dynamics and that this dynamics in turn allows us to accurately calculate the response to a change in the diffusion. Interestingly, the effective dynamics…
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Taxonomy
TopicsClimate Change Policy and Economics · Game Theory and Applications
