Resource Allocation with Karma Mechanisms
Kevin Riehl, Anastasios Kouvelas, Michail Makridis

TL;DR
This paper reviews Karma mechanisms, non-monetary resource currencies, highlighting their principles, applications, and potential for fair, efficient resource allocation without traditional monetary systems.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive review, systematic comparison, and a structured framework for designing Karma-based resource allocation mechanisms.
Findings
Karma mechanisms embody fairness and near incentive compatibility.
They can incentivize resource scarcity reduction.
The literature on Karma is diverse and lacks coherence.
Abstract
Monetary markets serve as established resource allocation mechanisms, typically achieving efficient solutions with limited information. However, they are susceptible to market failures, particularly under the presence of public goods, externalities, or inequality of economic power. Moreover, in many resource allocating contexts, money faces social, ethical, and legal constraints. Consequently, research increasingly explores artificial currencies and non-monetary markets, with Karma emerging as a notable concept. Karma, a non-tradeable, resource-inherent currency for prosumer resources, operates on the principles of contribution and consumption of specific resources. It embodies fairness, near incentive compatibility, Pareto-efficiency, robustness to population heterogeneity, and can incentivize a reduction in resource scarcity. The literature on Karma is scattered across disciplines,…
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