Evolution of cooperation with the diversity of cooperation tendencies
Linya Huang, Wenchen Han

TL;DR
This paper investigates how increasing diversity in cooperation tendencies among agents in a weak prisoners' dilemma game enhances overall cooperation levels and stability, highlighting the importance of cooperation efficiency and strategy diversity.
Contribution
Introduces a model incorporating diverse cooperation tendencies into the weak prisoners' dilemma, revealing how strategy diversity promotes cooperation and stability.
Findings
Higher cooperation tendency diversity increases overall cooperation.
Cooperation efficiency oscillates and declines when cooperator clusters are invaded.
Diversity supports survival of rational agents under noise effects.
Abstract
The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones. In this work, the diversity of strategies is introduced into the weak prisoners' dilemma game, which is measured by the diversity of the cooperation tendency. A higher diversity means more cooperation tendencies are provided. The complete cooperation strategy is the full cooperation tendency and the complete defection strategy is without any cooperation tendency. Agents with other cooperation tendencies behave as partial cooperators and as partial defectors simultaneously. The numerical simulation shows that increasing the diversity of the cooperation tendency promotes the cooperation level, not only the number of cooperators but also the average…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFood Industry and Aquatic Biology
