I Still See You: Why Existing IoT Traffic Reshaping Fails
Su Wang, Keyang Yu, Qi Li, Dong Chen

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive framework and a novel attack method revealing significant privacy vulnerabilities in IoT traffic, demonstrating current defenses are inadequate and providing a tool for systematic evaluation.
Contribution
The paper presents ITEMTK, an open-source system for evaluating IoT traffic analysis attacks and defenses, along with a new image-based attack that bypasses existing privacy measures.
Findings
Current defenses are insufficient against new image-based attacks
IoT traffic analysis can infer sensitive user information
ITEMTK enables systematic benchmarking of attacks and defenses
Abstract
The Internet traffic data produced by the Internet of Things (IoT) devices are collected by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and device manufacturers, and often shared with their third parties to maintain and enhance user services. Unfortunately, on-path adversaries could infer and fingerprint users' sensitive privacy information such as occupancy and user activities by analyzing these network traffic traces. While there's a growing body of literature on defending against this side-channel attack-malicious IoT traffic analytics (TA), there's currently no systematic method to compare and evaluate the comprehensiveness of these existing studies. To address this problem, we design a new low-cost, open-source system framework-IoT Traffic Exposure Monitoring Toolkit (ITEMTK) that enables people to comprehensively examine and validate prior attack models and their defending approaches. In…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Grid Security and Resilience · IoT and GPS-based Vehicle Safety Systems
