On constrained matchings, stable under random preferences
Boris Pittel

TL;DR
This paper studies the existence and number of stable matchings in a bipartite setting with random admissibility of pairs, revealing phase transitions depending on the probability parameter p.
Contribution
It extends previous work by analyzing the impact of random admissibility on stable matchings, identifying thresholds for their existence and quantity.
Findings
Expected number of stable matchings tends to 0 if p<log^2(n)/n.
A stable matching exists whp if p>(9/4)log^2(n)/n.
Number of unmatched individuals grows as a fractional power of n if p<log^2(n)/n.
Abstract
Colloquially, there are two groups, men and women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching. If some pairs are not admissible, then such a matching may not exist, but a properly defined partial stable matching exists always, and all such matchings involve the same, equi-numerous, groups of men and women. Earlier we proved that, for the complete, random, preference lists, with high probability (whp) the total number of complete stable matchings is, roughly, of order , at least. Here we consider the case that the preference lists are still complete, but a generic pair (man,woman) is admissible with probability , independently of all other pairs. It is shown that the expected number of complete stable matchings tends to …
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
