Simulations of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols

TL;DR

This paper uses simulations to evaluate the practical implementation and security vulnerabilities of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols, highlighting device limitations and potential attack strategies.

Contribution

It provides detailed simulation-based analysis of the performance and security threats of differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way QKD protocols.

Findings

Device imperfections affect protocol security.

Simulated eavesdropping attacks reveal potential vulnerabilities.

Performance metrics for practical QKD implementations.

Abstract

Quantum technology can enable secure communication for cryptography purposes using quantum key distribution. Quantum key distribution protocols provide a secret key between two users with security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. To define the proper implementation of a quantum key distribution system using a particular cryptography protocol, it is crucial to critically and meticulously assess the device's performance due to technological limitations in the components used. We perform simulations on the ANSYS Interconnect platform to characterise the practical implementation of these devices using distributed-phase-reference protocols differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way quantum key distribution. Further, we briefly describe and simulate some possible eavesdropping attempts, backflash attack, trojan-horse attack and detector-blinding attack exploiting the device imperfections.