Resilient Random Time-hopping Reply against Distance Attacks in UWB Ranging

TL;DR

This paper introduces a secure UWB ranging scheme using random time-hopping to prevent distance reduction attacks, maintaining compatibility with standards and demonstrating high effectiveness through simulations and experiments.

Contribution

It proposes a novel random time-hopping mechanism for secure UWB ranging that reduces attack success rates and is compatible with existing standards.

Findings

Reduces success rate of distance reduction attacks to below 0.01%

Demonstrates effectiveness through simulation and experimental validation

Maintains backward compatibility with IEEE standards

Abstract

In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.