The Integrated Information Theory needs Attention

TL;DR

The paper argues that the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness must incorporate attention to fully explain conscious experience and address current limitations, challenging some existing claims of dissociation between attention and consciousness.

Contribution

It highlights the necessity of including attention in IIT and critiques the claim of a dissociation between attention and consciousness within the theory.

Findings

IIT currently neglects the role of attention in consciousness.

Without attention, IIT cannot explain informational differences in experiences.

The claimed dissociation between attention and consciousness is incompatible with IIT.

Abstract

The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) might be our current best bet at a scientific explanation of phenomenal consciousness. IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. Currently, it offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future developments shall explain the qualitative structures of every possible conscious experience. But this ambitious project is hindered by one fundamental limitation. IIT fails to acknowledge the crucial roles of attention in generating phenomenally conscious experience and shaping its contents. Here, we argue that IIT urgently needs an account of attention. Without this account, IIT cannot explain important informational differences between different kinds of experiences. Furthermore, though some IIT proponents celebratedly endorse a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis reveals that such as dissociation is in fact incompatible with IIT. Notably, the issues we raise for IIT will likely arise for many internalist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, especially theories with primitivist inclinations. Our arguments also extend to the recently popularized structuralist approaches. Overall, our discussion highlights how considerations about attention are indispensable for scientific as well as philosophical theorizing about conscious experience.