The Limits of Interval-Regulated Price Discrimination
Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Renzhe Xu

TL;DR
This paper investigates how regulating price intervals in third-degree price discrimination affects market segmentation and surplus distribution, revealing that consumer surplus can be maximized through alternative segmentations even under constraints.
Contribution
It introduces novel segmentation constructions that characterize the entire surplus space under price interval regulation, overcoming limitations of classical methods.
Findings
Existence of segmentations that maximize consumer surplus within price constraints
Complete characterization of achievable buyer and seller surplus combinations
Development of three segmentation methods tailored to different surplus objectives
Abstract
In this paper, we study third-degree price discrimination in a model first presented by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris [2015]. Since such price discrimination might create market segments with vastly different posted prices, we consider regulating these prices, specifically, by restricting them to lie within an interval. Given a price interval, we consider segmentations of the market where a seller, who is oblivious to the existence of such regulation, still posts prices within the price interval. We show the following surprising result: For any market and price interval where such segmentation is feasible, there is always a different segmentation that optimally transfers all excess surplus to the consumers. In addition, we characterize the entire space of buyer and seller surplus that is achievable by such segmentation, including maximizing seller surplus, and simultaneously minimizing…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsMerger and Competition Analysis
