Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies
Vasilis Livanos, Kalen Patton, Sahil Singla

TL;DR
This paper advances auction and prophet inequality mechanisms by leveraging graphical dependency models, achieving exponential improvements over previous results for complex buyer valuations and dependency structures.
Contribution
It introduces new approximation algorithms for revenue maximization and prophet inequalities under Markov Random Field dependencies, improving upon prior exponential bounds.
Findings
O(Δ)-approximation for revenue with subadditive buyers
Exponential improvement over previous bounds for additive/unit-demand buyers
Matching upper bound for prophet inequality approximation
Abstract
Over the past two decades, significant strides have been made in stochastic problems such as revenue-optimal auction design and prophet inequalities, traditionally modeled with independent random variables to represent the values of items. However, in many applications, this assumption of independence often diverges from reality. Given the strong impossibility results associated with arbitrary correlations, recent research has pivoted towards exploring these problems under models of mild dependency. In this work, we study the optimal auction and prophet inequalities problems within the framework of the popular graphical model of Markov Random Fields (MRFs), a choice motivated by its ability to capture complex dependency structures. Specifically, for the problem of selling items to a single buyer to maximize revenue, we show that the max of SRev and BRev is an…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMulti-Criteria Decision Making
