Tuition too high? Blame competition
Oleg V. Pavlov, Evangelos Katsamakas

TL;DR
This paper presents a feedback-based model showing that competition among colleges for reputation and resources can lead to tuition increases, contrary to the common belief that competition lowers prices.
Contribution
It introduces a formal feedback theory and duopoly model demonstrating how competition can escalate tuition and institutional costs in higher education.
Findings
Competition increases tuition, debt, and expenditures in most scenarios.
Ignoring rankings can decrease tuition and related costs.
Feedback effects explain tuition escalation in competitive college markets.
Abstract
We develop a feedback theory that includes reinforcing and balancing feedback effects that emerge when colleges compete for reputation, applicants, and tuition revenue. The feedback theory is replicated in a formal duopoly model consisting of two competing colleges. An independent ranking entity determines the relative order of the colleges. College applicants choose between the two colleges based on the rankings and the financial aid offered by the colleges. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that competition lowers prices and benefits consumers, our simulations show that competition between academic institutions for resources and reputation leads to tuition escalation that negatively affects students and their families. Four of the five scenarios -- rankings, a capital campaign, facilities improvements, and an excellence campaign -- increase college tuition, institutional debt, and…
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