
TL;DR
This paper introduces limited-perception games where players have individualized, potentially inaccurate perceptions of payoffs, and explores equilibrium concepts and computational aspects in these games, highlighting the complexity and tractability results.
Contribution
It formalizes limited-perception games with hierarchical response functions and demonstrates existence of approximate equilibria with compact representations, also identifying tractable subclasses.
Findings
Existence of ε-equilibria with size independent of perception domain
Higher-order response functions capture strategic reasoning under perception limitations
Certain zero-sum classes allow for tractable equilibrium computation
Abstract
We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an individualized perception of all players' payoff functions. The accuracy of a player's perception is determined by the player's capability level. Capability levels are countable and totally ordered, with a higher level corresponding to a more accurate perception. We study the rational behavior of players in these games and formalize relevant equilibria conditions. In contrast to equilibria in conventional bimatrix games, which can be represented by a pair of mixed strategies, in our limited perception games a higher-order response function captures how the lower-capability player uses their (less accurate) perception of the payoff function to reason about the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications
