Surveilling the Masses with Wi-Fi-Based Positioning Systems
Erik Rye, Dave Levin

TL;DR
This paper reveals a privacy vulnerability in Wi-Fi Positioning Systems, demonstrating how an attacker can globally map and track billions of Wi-Fi access points and devices, with significant privacy implications.
Contribution
The work uncovers a novel attack exploiting Wi-Fi BSSID geolocation data to create a worldwide, longitudinal dataset of access points, enabling device tracking and privacy breaches.
Findings
Mapped over 2 billion BSSIDs globally within a year.
Demonstrated tracking of devices in conflict zones and disaster areas.
Provided recommendations for improving Wi-Fi privacy security.
Abstract
Wi-Fi-based Positioning Systems (WPSes) are used by modern mobile devices to learn their position using nearby Wi-Fi access points as landmarks. In this work, we show that Apple's WPS can be abused to create a privacy threat on a global scale. We present an attack that allows an unprivileged attacker to amass a worldwide snapshot of Wi-Fi BSSID geolocations in only a matter of days. Our attack makes few assumptions, merely exploiting the fact that there are relatively few dense regions of allocated MAC address space. Applying this technique over the course of a year, we learned the precise locations of over 2 billion BSSIDs around the world. The privacy implications of such massive datasets become more stark when taken longitudinally, allowing the attacker to track devices' movements. While most Wi-Fi access points do not move for long periods of time, many devices -- like compact…
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Taxonomy
TopicsHuman Mobility and Location-Based Analysis · Data-Driven Disease Surveillance
