Share-Based Fairness for Arbitrary Entitlements
Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige

TL;DR
This paper addresses fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with arbitrary entitlements, proposing a share-based fairness approach that guarantees each agent at least half of their share value, which is proven to be optimal.
Contribution
It introduces a novel share-based fairness framework for arbitrary entitlements and characterizes the best achievable guarantees for both goods and chores.
Findings
For additive valuations over goods, a half-share guarantee is achievable and optimal.
For chores, both ex-ante and ex-post guarantees can be achieved simultaneously.
The paper provides tight bounds for what can be achieved under share-based fairness notions.
Abstract
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent has a valuation function and an entitlement , where entitlements sum up to~1. Which allocation should one choose in situations in which agents fail to agree on one acceptable fairness notion? We study this problem in the case in which each agent focuses on the value she gets, and fairness notions are restricted to be {\em share based}. A {\em share} is an function that maps every to a value , representing the minimal value should get, and is {\em feasible} if it is always possible to give every agent value of at least . Our main result is that for additive valuations over goods there is an allocation that gives every agent at least half her share value, regardless of which feasible…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
