Bytes to Schlep? Use a FEP: Hiding Protocol Metadata with Fully Encrypted Protocols
Ellis Fenske, Aaron Johnson

TL;DR
This paper introduces formal security definitions for Fully Encrypted Protocols (FEPs) that hide protocol metadata, presents new FEP constructions with security proofs, and evaluates existing protocols' effectiveness in metadata protection.
Contribution
It provides the first formal security definitions for FEPs, develops new secure FEP designs, and analyzes existing protocols' metadata-hiding capabilities.
Findings
New security definitions for FEPs in TCP and UDP models
Proposed FEP constructions with proven security properties
Survey of existing FEPs and their metadata protection effectiveness
Abstract
Fully Encrypted Protocols (FEPs) have arisen in practice as a technique to avoid network censorship. Such protocols are designed to produce messages that appear completely random. This design hides communications metadata, such as version and length fields, and makes it difficult to even determine what protocol is being used. Moreover, these protocols frequently support padding to hide the length of protocol fields and the contained message. These techniques have relevance well beyond censorship circumvention, as protecting protocol metadata has security and privacy benefits for all Internet communications. The security of FEP designs depends on cryptographic assumptions, but neither security definitions nor proofs exist for them. We provide novel security definitions that capture the metadata-protection goals of FEPs. Our definitions are given in both the datastream and datagram…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGerman History and Society · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
